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Abstract
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) report evidence that distinct utility functions govern choices
under certainty and risk. I investigate the robustness of this result to the experimental design. I
ﬁnd that the eﬀect disappears completely when a multiple price list instrument is used instead of
a convex time budget design. Alternatively, the eﬀect is reduced by half when sooner and later
payment risks are realized using a single lottery instead of two independent lotteries. The result
is thus at least partially driven by intertemporal diversiﬁcation, supporting an explanation in
terms of concavity of the intertemporal, and not only atemporal, utility function.
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The past decade has seen rapid advances in the development of both experimental designs and
estimation procedures to measure the utility and discount functions that govern individual choices
over time. These advances are signiﬁcant both because many important economic decisions entail
consequences at diﬀerent points in time, and because a substantial earlier literature found wide
disparities in estimated discount rates  including many that seem extraordinarily large.1
One important reason for these high discount rate estimates is the fact that estimates which
assume a linear utility function will be upwardly biased when the utility function is in fact concave.
This is because under concave utility, both diminishing marginal utility and discounting for time
delay will tend to favor the choice of a smaller sooner reward. Therefore if the former is assumed
away, then the eﬀect of the latter will be overstated. The recent literature identiﬁes at least three
approaches to correcting for this bias. These are the joint estimation strategy of Andersen et al.
(2008), the Convex Time Budget (CTB) design of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a), and the binary
lottery procedure of Laury, McInnes and Swarthout (2012). In this paper, I consider the properties
of the ﬁrst two of these approaches, under conditions in which the payments in a discounting
experiment are subject to risk.
The Andersen et al. (2008) approach combines two sets of tasks  one designed to elicit curvature
of the utility function, and the other designed to elicit time preference  in a joint estimation
procedure, with the curvature estimated from the former used to correct the discount rate estimated
from the latter. In the Andersen et al. experimental design, both tasks utilize Multiple Price List
(MPL) instruments, in which subjects make a series of binary choices.2 In particular, in each decision
in a discounting MPL, a subject chooses to receive either a smaller sooner payment or a larger later
one. By contrast, the key design innovation in the CTB approach of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a)
is to allow the subject to choose any convex combination of the two payments.3 The subject is given
an endowment of tokens to allocate between two dates, with tokens allocated to the sooner date
yielding a smaller return than ones allocated to the later date. As the exchange rate between the
two dates is varied a subject's choices trace out a price expansion path in terms of sooner and
later earnings, along which optimal choices depend upon both the utility curvature and discounting
parameters. Within this framework, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a) derive the analytical solution
function and demonstrate how it is possible to obtain estimates of both parameters using only a
single instrument.
Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2013) review the CTB design and associated estimation procedures
adopted by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a), and express a range of misgivings in relation to both.
For present purposes, two of their concerns are worth noting. Firstly, Harrison, Lau and Rutström
argue that the CTB design cannot infer the curvature of utility under alternatives to expected
utility theory such as rank dependent utility (Quiggin 1982). They note that this could be remedied
1This early literature is thoroughly reviewed by Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (2002).
2The MPL design for curvature is based upon Holt and Laury (2002), while the MPL for time preference is due
to Coller and Williams (1999). Although the Holt and Laury instrument is typically interpreted as a measure of risk
preference, Andersen et al. are not concerned with this per se but rather the implied curvature of the utility function.
3A version of this procedure was proposed by Cubitt and Read (2007).
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through the introduction of an additional task for the purpose of identifying probability weighting,
as well as utility curvature, yet this would also undermine the design parsimony that makes the
CTB approach appealing.
Secondly, Harrison, Lau and Rutström highlight the fact that in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a)
 in which payments were not subject to risk  the majority of observed choices are corner solutions,
and moreover choices are observed at both the all-sooner and all-later corners. The data is thus
bimodal, yet Andreoni and Sprenger model it using a non-linear least squares (NLS) estimator,
which seeks to explain the mean of the data. As Harrison, Lau and Rutström observe, these
estimates indeed do a good job of predicting the mean; unfortunately, very few of the actual choices
are found to to fall around that mean. To avoid this diﬃculty, Harrison, Lau and Rutström propose
an alternative multinomial logit (MNL) estimator that seeks to explain the entire distribution of the
data. Applying this estimator to the original data, they ﬁnd that it in fact implies a convex utility
function, which is explained by the fact that the model needs to account for corner solutions at both
boundaries. Since Harrison, Lau and Rutström consider convex utility to be a priori implausible,
they interpret this result to cast doubt upon subjects' comprehension of the CTB instrument.
In a companion paper, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) extend the CTB design to settings in
which payments are subject to risk and report evidence of a direct preference for certainty (p. 3357)
in intertemporal choice, indicating that diﬀerent utility functions govern choices under certainty as
distinct from risk. In their main manipulation, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) compare CTB
decisions in which payments on both dates are certain to ones in which both payments are received
with 50 percent probability, as realized by two independent lotteries. They ﬁnd that in the risky
condition, subjects choose more balanced portfolios of sooner and later payments (Andreoni and
Sprenger 2012b, Figure 2), consistent with their interpretation that these choices are governed by
a (atemporal) utility function that is more concave than that which applies under conditions of
certainty.4
The proposition that diﬀerent utility functions might apply under certainty as distinct from
risk has immediate implications for the joint estimation strategy of Andersen et al. (2008). In
particular, since Andersen et al. elicit utility curvature under conditions of risk, and combine this
with discounting behavior elicited under conditions of certainty, their approach implicitly assumes
that a single utility function governs choices in both sets of tasks. However if Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012b) are correct in suggesting that there are distinct utility functions under risk and certainty,
then joint estimation may itself result in misleading inferences. In particular, if the utility function
were indeed more concave under risk then the Andersen et al. procedure would overcorrect for
utility curvature in discounting under certainty, resulting in an underestimate of the discount rate.
To obtain an unbiased estimate, it would be necessary to combine discounting and curvature data
obtained under comparable risk conditions.
4Andreoni and Sprenger interpret their result as supporting a u-v  preference model characterized by discontinuity
at certainty. Appendix Table A2 in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) reports their structural estimates indicating
that the v  function estimated under certainty is close to linear, whereas the u function estimated under risk is
substantially more concave.
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On the other hand, recall that in a discounting MPL a subject chooses either to receive a smaller
sooner or a larger later payment, whereas in a CTB decision it is possible to choose a mixture of the
two. This distinction becomes critical when the element of risk is added to the payments, as ﬁrst
pointed out by Andersen et al. (2011, Section 5) and Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2013). Since
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) realize their sooner and later CTB payments using two independent
lotteries, a subject could spread these risks by choosing a mixture of the two payments, whereas at a
corner allocation payment depends only on a single lottery. Since this intertemporal diversiﬁcation
motive does not arise when both payments are certain, it provides an alternative explanation for
Andreoni and Sprenger's ﬁnding of more balanced intertemporal portfolio allocations under risk as
compared to certainty.
Motivated by these two observations  the ﬁrst being an implication of Andreoni and Sprenger's
(2012b) result for the joint estimation strategy of Andersen et al. (2008), and the second being a
procedural aspect of the CTB design as applied to choices involving risk  in this paper I investigate
the robustness of Andreoni and Sprenger's result to two simple modiﬁcations of the experimental
design. Firstly, in my MPL experiment I replicate the design and estimation procedures of Andersen
et al., adding a set of discounting MPLs in which payments are received with 50 percent probability.
With this data, I can compare the results of joint estimation when both utility curvature and
discounting are elicited under risk to when the latter is elicited under certainty as in Andersen et al.
(2008), and thus assess the magnitude of any bias in the joint estimation procedure. Moreover,
this experiment embeds a replication of the main (1, 1) versus (0.5, 0.5) manipulation in Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012b) in which the CTB instrument is replaced by an MPL. Secondly, in my CTB
experiment I replicate the design and estimation procedures of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b),
adding a set of CTBs in which both payments are received with 50 percent probability as realized
by a single lottery. In this condition the sooner and later payment risks are perfectly correlated,
and by comparing it to a corresponding independent lotteries condition I can assess what portion
of Andreoni and Sprenger's result is driven by diversiﬁcation behavior.
In my MPL data, I ﬁnd almost no evidence of diﬀerences in intertemporal choice under risk
compared to certainty. As a result, the riskiness of payments has a negligible eﬀect upon the results
of the Andersen et al. joint estimation procedure. One possible explanation may be that the binary
choice nature of the MPL does not permit intertemporal diversiﬁcation: in a discounting MPL,
even when payments are subject to risk, there is only ever a single payment as realized by a single
lottery.
The CTB experiment identiﬁes the eﬀect of removing diversiﬁcation opportunities from the An-
dreoni and Sprenger (2012b) design. The CTB data indicate that in the correlated risks condition
 in which payments are subject to risk but diversiﬁcation is not possible  the diﬀerence in behav-
ior relative to certainty is reduced by just over one-half when compared to the independent risks
condition. Direct examination of the choice data indicates clearly that the three risk conditions are
distinct and diﬀer signiﬁcantly from one another. However, at the same time, an implementation
of the structural MNL model introduced by Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2013) cannot reject the
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hypothesis that a single set of curvature and discounting parameters explains choices under both
certainty and correlated risks (with the independent risks condition being distinct from these two).
Just as the standard model of discounted expected utility (DEU) cannot explain Andreoni and
Sprenger's (2012b) original ﬁnding of a diﬀerence between certainty and independent risks, it also
cannot explain my ﬁnding of a diﬀerence between independent and correlated risks, since the stan-
dard model in fact predicts the same behavior in all three conditions. In particular, the linearity of
the intertemporal utility function in the standard model implies that it does not predict intertem-
poral diversiﬁcation. A simple extension to allow concavity of intertemporal utility  corresponding
to the correlation aversion model examined by Andersen et al. (2011)  generates a prediction of
diﬀerential behavior under independent versus correlated risks. Through an extension of the MNL
framework, I am able to estimate the parameters of this model using my CTB data and conﬁrm
the ﬁnding of concave intertemporal utility.5 Yet even this model does not predict any diﬀerence in
behavior between certainty and correlated risks,6 and insofar as I ﬁnd evidence of such a diﬀerence
this remains open for interpretation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the design and results of
my MPL experiment, Section 2 presents the design and results of my CTB experiment, Section 3
presents support for the concave intertemporal utility hypothesis, and Section 4 concludes. State-
ments of model predictions, detailed enumeration of experiment parameters, and the full text of the
instructions are provided in the Online Appendices.
1 Multiple price list experiment
1.1 Design and procedures
The design of my MPL experiment was based upon Andersen et al. (2008). Each subject completed
four risk preference MPL tables to identify utility curvature, as well as eight time preference MPL
tables, with a total of ten binary decision rows in each table. In four of the discounting tasks
both the sooner and later payment options were certain, while the other four were identical except
that both payment options were received with 50 percent probability. The risk preference and
certain discounting components thus replicate the design of Andersen et al., while the certain and
risky discounting components replicate the main conditions in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) using
an MPL instrument instead of a CTB. In particular, the standard DEU model predicts the same
pattern of choices under both the certain and risky discounting conditions, just as it does in the
CTB design of Andreoni and Sprenger (see Online Appendix A for details).
The payoﬀs in the risk preference tasks were chosen to span a similar range as the time preference
tasks, and thus measure curvature over the relevant region of the utility function. In the discounting
tasks, the sooner payment option always carried a front-end delay of one week while the later
5Using a diﬀerent experimental design and estimation procedure, Andersen et al. (2011) previously obtained this
result in a sample representative of the adult Danish population.
6Formal statements of the implications of the two models are set out in Online Appendix A.
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payment option was delayed by a further three, six, nine, or twelve weeks.7 All payment dates thus
fell on the same weekday as the experiment itself, and were also designed to fall within teaching
weeks of the current semester, avoiding holidays.
Each subject was paid for one randomly-chosen risk preference decision, received in cash before
leaving the laboratory. Each subject also had one time preference decision randomly chosen to count
for payment. If this decision was one that involved risk, the lottery to determine whether or not
the payment option chosen by the subject would in fact be sent was also realized before leaving the
laboratory. However the actual payment, being delayed, was made by check, drawn on the campus
branch of the National Australia Bank and mailed by Australia Post guaranteed Express Post.8
A total of 81 student subjects completed the MPL experiment at an Australian research univer-
sity on 26 and 27 July 2011. The realized average payments were AUD 19 for the risk preference
component, and AUD 21 for the time preference component.9 The experiment was conducted using
pen and paper, and took approximately 90 minutes to complete.10
1.2 Results of the MPL experiment
Figure 1 summarizes aggregate discounting behavior in the MPL experiment, with each panel cor-
responding to a diﬀerent delay length between the sooner and later payment options. In each panel,
the percentage of subjects who chose the sooner option in each decision is plotted against the gross
experimental interest rate (i.e. the ratio of the value of the later to the sooner payment options),
with the conﬁdence bars representing the normal approximation to the 95 percent conﬁdence in-
terval for a binomial proportion. This presentation thus mirrors that of Figure 2 in Andreoni and
Sprenger (2012b).
In contrast to Andreoni and Sprenger's results using a CTB instrument, Figure 1 clearly shows
that in my MPL data there is very little evidence of any systematic deviation in discounting behavior
under risk as compared to certainty. In particular, out of 40 possible pairwise comparisons, there
are none in which the proportion of sooner choices in the certain condition falls outside of the
95 percent conﬁdence interval for the risky condition, and only three cases in which the converse
holds.11 In short, the eﬀect reported by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) largely disappears when
7Full details of the parameters of the MPL decisions are provided in Online Appendix B.1. In the three and nine
week discounting horizons, the smaller sooner payment option was ﬁxed and the larger later option varied, consistent
with the design of Andersen et al.. In the six and twelve week horizons, the larger later option was ﬁxed and the
smaller sooner option varied, consistent with the design of Andreoni and Sprenger.
8Australia Post guarantees next-day delivery for articles mailed by Express Post, at a cost of approximately
AUD 5 per envelope. The procedures also incorporated several other measures adopted by Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012a) to minimize the background risk associated with future payments. In particular, subjects addressed their
own envelopes, wrote their own payment amounts and dates inside their envelopes, and were given the business card
of the experimenter to contact in the event of a payment not arriving as expected.
9At the time of the MPL experiment, one AUD was worth approximately USD 1.10.
10The full text of the instructions for the MPL experiment are provided in Online Appendix C. The risk preference
tasks were always completed ﬁrst, and half of the subjects completed the discounting tasks under certainty before
discounting under risk while for the other half this order was reversed. There was no evidence of any order eﬀect.
11These correspond to the gross interest rates of 1.45 and 1.5 in the three-week horizon, and the gross interest rate
of 1.4 in the nine-week horizon. However, as can be seen in Figure 1, even these diﬀerences are slight.
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Figure 1: Aggregate Behavior in MPL Discounting Tasks.
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an MPL design is used in place of their CTB.
Recall that the MPL experiment was motivated by the possibility that diﬀerences in preferences
under risk versus certainty might cause the joint estimation procedure developed by Andersen et al.
(2008) to be biased. To examine this possibility, I replicate the Andersen et al. estimates using my
MPL data and report the results in Table 1. In particular, I adopt the same structural model and
notation as Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b, Appendix B), who assume an exponentially-discounted
CRRA utility function:
U = δt (ct − ω)α + δt+k (ct+k − ω)α (1)
where t is the front-end delay in days to the sooner payment option, k is the additional delay to the
later option, c denotes experimental earnings and ω is a background parameter.12 The parameter
α measures utility curvature such that (1− α) is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, and δ is
the daily exponential discount factor such that ρ ≡ 1/δ365 − 1 is the implied (net) annual discount
rate. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) assume an exponential discount function because the analysis
12If ω is positive, it may be interpreted as a Stone-Geary minimum or reference point. If it is negative, B ≡ −ω
may be interpreted as background consumption.
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of quasi-hyperbolic discounting is precluded by the fact that all sooner payments carry a front-end
delay. However, as I emphasize in stating model predictions in Online Appendix A, the speciﬁcation
of the discount function is not germane to the core issue of diﬀerential behavior under risk versus
certainty.
Model (1) in Table 1 reports estimates of the annual discount rate using the time preference
data only and assuming linear utility. Model (2) reports joint estimates of utility curvature and
discounting using both the risk and time preference data and allowing for concave utility. In each
model, the estimate of the annual discount rate ρ is permitted to diﬀer between the discounting
tasks elicited under certainty as compared to risk. In particular, the joint estimate of ρCert in
model (2) combines utility curvature elicited under risk with discounting elicited under certainty,
and corresponds to the original estimation procedure in Andersen et al. (2008). This estimate is
potentially misspeciﬁed if those choices are governed by distinct utility functions. By contrast, the
joint estimate of ρRisk is estimated from discounting choices under risk and as a result it is robust
to this form of misspeciﬁcation.
The parameters µ and ν are structural noise terms to model decision errors in the curvature and
discounting choices respectively, and moreover the estimate of ν is permitted to diﬀer between the
discounting tasks elicited under risk and certainty. Speciﬁcally, in each risk preference decision, given
a candidate value of the curvature parameter α the expected utility is evaluated for each of the two
alternatives, A and B, and the likelihood that A is chosen is modeled as EU
1/µ
A /
(
EU
1/µ
A + EU
1/µ
B
)
;
the ν parameters enter the discounting speciﬁcation analogously. The models were estimated by
maximum likelihood in Stata 10.1 following procedures set out in Andersen et al. (2008), with the
background parameter set to ω = 0 and robust standard errors clustered on individual subjects.
In model (1) of Table 1, which does not correct for curvature of the utility function, the annual
discount rate is estimated at 115.3 percent when payments are certain and 114.2 percent when
they are received with 50 percent probability. The diﬀerence between these estimates is clearly
not statistically signiﬁcant (p = 0.933). This conﬁrms what was already apparent from Figure
1, namely that in the MPL data discounting behavior under the two risk conditions is virtually
indistinguishable.
In model (2), the estimate of the utility curvature parameter α is 0.430, implying a coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion of 0.570. Correcting for this curvature in joint estimation lowers the estimated
annual discount rate to 39.1 percent under certainty and 38.8 percent under risk. These estimates
are clearly very close, and the diﬀerence between them is both inconsequential compared to the
eﬀect of correcting for curvature relative to the estimates in model (1) and clearly not statistically
signiﬁcant (p = 0.933). This establishes the main result from the MPL experiment, namely that
the possibility that distinct utility functions might govern discounting under risk versus certainty
does not appear to bias the results of the Andersen et al. joint estimation procedure for estimating
discount rates from MPL data.
The ﬁnding that discounting behavior does not diﬀer under risk versus certainty in an MPL
experiment is consistent with the standard DEU model. However, given that Andreoni and Sprenger
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Table 1: Estimates of Utility Curvature and Annual Discount Rates from MPL Data.
(1) (2)
Assuming Linear Utility Allowing Concave Utility
Coef. s.e. 95% C.I. Coef. s.e. 95% C.I.
α 0.430 0.050 0.332 0.529
ρCert 1.153 0.242 0.678 1.628 0.391 0.082 0.230 0.552
ρRisk 1.142 0.271 0.612 1.673 0.388 0.089 0.213 0.563
µ 0.065 0.008 0.050 0.081
νCert 0.114 0.011 0.093 0.136 0.049 0.007 0.035 0.063
νRisk 0.129 0.014 0.102 0.156 0.056 0.009 0.038 0.073
H0 : ρCert = ρRisk χ
2 (1) = 0.01, p = 0.933 χ2 (1) = 0.01, p = 0.933
Log-likelihood =3443.067 =4357.753
Observations 6480 9720
Clusters 81 81
Notes: ML estimates with the restriction ω = 0. The structural noise parameters µ and ν model
decision errors in the curvature and discounting choices respectively. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the level of individual subjects.
(2012b) do not obtain the same result in their CTB design, it cannot automatically be taken as
endorsement of that model. One potential explanation for the diﬀerence in results is that in a
discounting MPL under risk, the possibility of intertemporal diversiﬁcation is precluded by the fact
that there is only ever a single payment determined by a single lottery. The purpose of my CTB
experiment is to further examine this conjecture, by removing the opportunity for diversiﬁcation
from the Andreoni and Sprenger design.
2 Convex time budget experiment
2.1 Design and procedures
The design of my CTB experiment was based closely upon that of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b).
In each CTB decision, a subject had an endowment of 100 tokens which they were free to allocate
as they pleased between the sooner and later payment dates at speciﬁed exchange rates. Across all
decisions, the exchange rate for tokens redeemed on the later payment date was ﬁxed, while the
sooner token exchange rate was adjusted to generate variation in the gross experimental interest
rate. Each subject made a total of 42 such decisions, comprising seven gross interest rates crossed
with two delay lengths, all repeated under three diﬀerent risk conditions.
In the certainty condition the payments on both dates would be sent for sure, while in the
independent risks condition both payments would be sent with 50 percent probability, as realized
by two independent lotteries. These conditions thus replicate the (1, 1) and (0.5, 0.5) conditions in
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b). Finally, in the correlated risks condition both payments would be
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sent with 50 percent probability, as realized by a single lottery. Thus in this condition it was not
possible for a subject to spread their risks over two lotteries by choosing a mixture of sooner and
later payments. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) show that the standard DEU model predicts the
same pattern of choices under certainty and independent risks; moreover it turns out that the same
holds for correlated risks as well (see Online Appendix A for details).
The parameters of the CTB experiment were identical to those of Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b,
Table 1), except that the delay lengths between sooner and later payments were changed from four
and eight weeks in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) to ﬁve and ten weeks, and payments were
denominated in AUD instead of USD.13 The sooner payment always carried a one-week front-end
delay, and all payment dates fell on the same weekday as the experiment itself, within teaching weeks
of the current semester, and avoiding holidays. The decision tables for the experiment replicated the
format adopted by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b), with the addition of a background color-shading
convention to distinguish between the three risk conditions.14
Each subject had one CTB decision randomly chosen to count for pay. If this decision was one
involving risk, then the lottery or lotteries to determine whether or not the chosen payments would
in fact be sent were realized before leaving the laboratory. Both the sooner and later payments
were made by check, drawn on the campus branch of the National Australia Bank, and mailed by
guaranteed next-day Express Post. Following Andreoni and Sprenger's procedures, each subject
received a show-up fee comprising two payments of AUD 5 each, sent on the sooner and later
payment dates respectively, with any additional earnings from the experiment added to these.
Since this implied that every subject would always receive two checks, it ensured that there was no
convenience beneﬁt to choosing a corner allocation accruing entirely on a single payment date. Since
every subject addressed their own envelopes prior to making their decisions, they could observe that
the experimenter was prepared to pay approximately AUD 5 to mail a check to the value of as little
as AUD 5 by Express Post. This imparted a high level of credibility to the payments.15
A total of 63 student subjects completed the CTB experiment on 20 and 22 March 2012. The
realized average payment was AUD 24 inclusive of the show-up fee.16 The experiment was conducted
using pen and paper, and took approximately 60 minutes to complete.17
13Full details of the parameters of the CTB decisions are provided in Online Appendix B.2. The reason for the
change in delay lengths was to avoid having one of the payment dates falling adjacent to a public holiday.
14As per Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b, Figure 1), subjects were provided with a calendar on the left-hand side
of each table with the date of the experiment and the sooner and later payment dates highlighted. In addition, in
the independent risks condition the columns corresponding to the sooner and later token allocations were shaded in
two diﬀerent colors to represent the colors of the two separate die that would be rolled to determine the payments.
In the correlated risks condition, both columns were shaded alike to indicate that a single die roll would determine
both payments. Finally, in the certainty condition both columns were unshaded to indicate that the payments would
not depend upon any die roll at all. Online Appendix E shows a sample decision sheet from the independent risks
condition.
15In the post-experiment questionnaire for the CTB experiment, 100 percent of subjects responded that they
trusted that they would be paid exactly as stated in the instructions.
16At the time of the CTB experiment, one AUD was worth approximately USD 1.05.
17The full text of the instructions for the CTB experiment are provided in Online Appendix D. Subjects who
participated in the earlier MPL experiment were excluded from the CTB study. Half of the subjects completed the
risk conditions in the order independent-certain-correlated, while for the other half this was reversed.
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Figure 2: Aggregate Behavior in CTB Discounting Tasks.
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2.2 Results of the CTB experiment
Figure 2 summarizes aggregate behavior in the CTB experiment, with each panel corresponding to
a diﬀerent delay length, using the same presentation as Figure 2 in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b).
The mean allocation of tokens (out of 100) to the sooner payment date is plotted as a function of
the gross interest rate (i.e. the ratio of the later to the sooner token redemption values) for each
risk condition, together with the corresponding 95 percent (±1.96 s.e.) conﬁdence intervals. The
mean allocations are also reported in tabular form on the left-hand side of Table 2, in which the
right-hand columns report p-values for Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests of equality of token allocations
in each pairwise comparison of risk conditions, at each delay and gross interest rate combination.
The patterns that emerge from close inspection of Figure 2 and from the signed-ranks tests are very
similar, and in the discussion that follows I use the latter as the preferred basis for comparison since
they avoid distributional assumptions and recognize the within-subjects nature of the data.
The ﬁrst important result that is apparent is that choices under certainty and independent risks
replicate the pattern observed by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) in their (1, 1) and (0.5, 0.5) condi-
tions: the mean token allocation between sooner and later payments is consistently more balanced
under independent risks compared to certainty. The diﬀerences between these two conditions are
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Table 2: Tests of Equality of Allocations in the CTB Experiment.
Gross Rate
Mean Sooner Token Allocation Wilcoxon signed-ranks p-values
Certain Independent Correlated Cert = Ind Cert = Corr Ind = Corr
A. Delay = 5 weeks
1.00 84.0 60.8 74.3 0.000 0.003 0.000
1.05 40.6 49.6 45.9 0.067 0.191 0.266
1.11 29.3 46.4 37.1 0.001 0.076 0.015
1.18 19.9 41.4 29.2 0.000 0.038 0.000
1.25 12.4 35.7 24.0 0.000 0.006 0.001
1.33 9.4 32.1 20.8 0.000 0.001 0.000
1.43 8.6 29.8 15.6 0.000 0.009 0.000
B. Delay = 10 weeks
1.00 86.9 64.9 81.5 0.000 0.010 0.000
1.05 50.0 57.0 53.7 0.117 0.508 0.436
1.11 38.8 55.0 43.6 0.001 0.248 0.008
1.18 30.6 47.0 35.5 0.000 0.130 0.007
1.25 26.4 39.2 32.9 0.001 0.077 0.064
1.33 20.9 33.0 27.7 0.003 0.040 0.134
1.43 15.5 29.6 21.5 0.001 0.038 0.038
always highly signiﬁcant, except at the gross interest rate of 1.05 where the two functions cross
over.
This pattern is inconsistent with the standard DEU model; however behavior under independent
risks may also reﬂect a diversiﬁcation motive that is absent when all payments are certain. The
correlated risks condition eliminates this possibility of diversiﬁcation while retaining the riskiness
of payments. If Andreoni and Sprenger's (2012b) result were robust to removing opportunities
for diversiﬁcation then behavior under correlated risks would coincide with that under independent
risks. On the other hand, if their result were driven entirely by diversiﬁcation then it would disappear
under correlated risks, such that behavior would coincide with that under certainty.
Figure 2 reveals that behavior under correlated risks is in fact clearly intermediate between
certainty and independent risks. Moreover, the test statistics reported in Table 2 indicate that the
diﬀerences in choices between all three risk conditions are generally signiﬁcant. This is especially
the case in the ﬁve-week delay horizon, in which they are consistently signiﬁcant except at the gross
interest rate of 1.05; in the ten-week horizon the diﬀerences become somewhat narrower, especially
in the comparison between certainty and correlated risks.
Direct evidence that behavior under independent risks is likely motivated in part by diversiﬁca-
tion may be seen by examining the incidence of corner solutions. Figure 3 reports the histogram of
sooner token allocations, pooled over all decisions within each risk condition. Under certainty corner
solutions are endemic, accounting for over 70 percent of all allocations (19.8 percent all sooner and
52.4 percent all later).18 Under independent risks  where diversiﬁcation favors the choice of an in-
18This only counts allocations exactly at the corners, whereas Figure 3 rounds allocations to the nearest ﬁve tokens.
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Figure 3: Observed CTB Choices by Risk Condition.
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terior solution  corner allocations are far less prevalent (5.1 and 11.6 percent respectively), and the
modal allocation is a 50-50 split. Under correlated risks  where the opportunity for diversiﬁcation
is taken away  corner solutions are three times as prevalent as under independent risks, accounting
for over 50 percent of all allocations (14.9 and 35.6 percent respectively).
For each pairwise comparison of risk conditions, I next follow Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b,
p. 3367) in performing non-parametric regressions of sooner token allocations on indicators for each
delay and gross interest rate combination interacted with the risk condition, with standard errors
clustered on individual subjects, and test for the joint signiﬁcance of all treatment interactions.
The results conﬁrm that all three risk conditions are distinct, with all diﬀerences found to be
highly signiﬁcant.19,20 Averaging over all decisions by all subjects, the mean absolute diﬀerence in
19For the comparison of certainty to independent risks, F14,62 = 11.04, p < 0.001. For certainty and correlated
risks, F14,62 = 2.29, p = 0.013. For independent and correlated risks, F14,62 = 5.13, p < 0.001. When the ten-
week horizon is considered in isolation, the diﬀerence between certainty and correlated risks ceases to be signiﬁcant:
F7,62 = 1.65, p = 0.137. However all other comparisons are highly signiﬁcant in both the ﬁve and ten-week horizons.
20An analysis of the consistency of choices at the individual level, comparing certainty to independent risks,
closely replicates the pattern reported in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b, Figure 3 Panel A). However turning to
the comparison between certainty and correlated risks, there is a clear shift in the direction of fewer and smaller
deviations in individual choice behavior, although these diﬀerences also clearly do not go away completely.
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allocations between certainty and independent risks is 29.65 tokens, while between certainty and
correlated risks it is 14.75 tokens. Thus overall, the eﬀect reported by Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012b) is reduced by slightly over one-half when the opportunity for diversiﬁcation is taken away.
This is the main aggregate conclusion from my CTB experiment.
How do these results aﬀect the structural estimates of utility curvature and discount rates
estimated from CTB data? Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b, Appendix B) derive the solution function
for the optimal sooner token allocation under the exponentially-discounted CRRA speciﬁcation in
equation (1), and from this estimate models by NLS in which the structural parameters are permitted
to diﬀer across their (1, 1) and (0.5, 0.5) risk conditions. They ﬁnd that the curvature estimates
diﬀer signiﬁcantly between risk conditions but that discount rates do not, and they interpret the
separate curvature parameters to represent two distinct utility functions: v (·) under certainty and
u (·) under risk.
In model (1) of Table 3, I replicate Andreoni and Sprenger's NLS estimation using data from my
CTB experiment. The upper panel reports estimates of utility curvature α and the annual discount
rate ρ, which are permitted to vary across the three risk conditions. The lower panel reports
hypothesis tests of both pairwise and joint equality of these parameters across risk conditions.
The model was estimated by NLS in Stata 10.1, following the procedures set out by Andreoni
and Sprenger (2012a; 2012b, Appendix B), with the background parameter ω set to zero (for
comparability with the other estimates that I report) and robust standard errors clustered on
individual subjects.
The NLS estimates in model (1) display the same pattern that was evident in the results reported
by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b): the diﬀerences in behavior across the three risk conditions
express themselves as diﬀerences in utility curvature as opposed to the estimated discount rates. The
diﬀerences in the estimated curvature parameters are always highly signiﬁcant in both pairwise and
joint tests; by contrast, the corresponding diﬀerences in estimated discount rates are consistently not
statistically signiﬁcant. Thus in the NLS speciﬁcation it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis
that a single discount function governs intertemporal choices across all three risk conditions.
However a concern with the NLS estimator, as ﬁrst pointed out by Harrison, Lau and Rutström
(2013), is that it focuses on explaining the mean of the data whereas Figure 3 indicates that under
certainty and correlated risks  the two conditions in which diversiﬁcation is not possible  the mass
of the data is located at the corners. To address this issue, Harrison, Lau and Rutström introduce
an alternative MNL estimator which compares the discounted utility of a subject's preferred token
allocation to that of each of the permissible alternatives. In model (2) of Table 3, I report a version
of this estimator as extended to CTB choices in which the payments are potentially subject to risk,
under the DEU speciﬁcation of equation (1).21
In my implementation of the MNL estimator, I ﬁrst round the observed sooner allocation to
the nearest multiple of ﬁve tokens, resulting in a multinomial choice from one of 21 allocations,
{0, 5, 10, . . . , 100}. Given candidate values of the structural parameters α and ρ, the experimental
21I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the use of this estimator.
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Table 3: Estimates of Utility Curvature and Annual Discount Rates from CTB Data.
(1) (2)
Non-linear Least Squares Multinomial Logit
A. Parameter Estimates
Coef. s.e. 95% C.I. Coef. s.e. 95% C.I.
αCert 0.924 0.008 0.908 0.941 1.152 0.013 1.127 1.176
αInd 0.796 0.022 0.751 0.841 0.913 0.054 0.807 1.019
αCorr 0.883 0.013 0.857 0.908 1.163 0.022 1.120 1.207
ρCert 0.592 0.133 0.326 0.858 0.987 0.202 0.592 1.381
ρInd 0.787 0.190 0.407 1.167 0.394 0.332 =0.257 1.044
ρCorr 0.705 0.165 0.376 1.034 1.045 0.256 0.543 1.547
B. Hypothesis Tests for Equality of Parameters across Risk Conditions
αCert = αInd F1,62 = 34.61, p < 0.001 χ
2 (1) = 21.35, p < 0.001
αCert = αCorr F1,62 = 17.77, p < 0.001 χ
2 (1) = 0.41, p = 0.524
αInd = αCorr F1,62 = 15.17, p < 0.001 χ
2 (1) = 23.74, p < 0.001
αCert = αInd = αCorr F2,62 = 22.37, p < 0.001 χ
2 (2) = 23.77, p < 0.001
ρCert = ρInd F1,62 = 1.50, p = 0.226 χ
2 (1) = 4.35, p = 0.037
ρCert = ρCorr F1,62 = 1.70, p = 0.197 χ
2 (1) = 0.20, p = 0.656
ρInd = ρCorr F1,62 = 0.26, p = 0.611 χ
2 (1) = 5.06, p = 0.025
ρCert = ρInd = ρCorr F2,62 = 1.27, p = 0.289 χ
2 (2) = 5.08, p = 0.079
R2 / Log-likelihood R2 = 0.697 LL = −6711.386
Observations 2646 2646
Clusters 63 63
Notes: Model (1): non-linear least squares estimates. Model (2): multinomial logit estimates.
Models estimated under the restriction ω = 0, with robust standard errors clustered at the
level of individual subjects.
parameters of a given decision (speciﬁcally, the delay lengths and token exchange rates), and setting
the background parameter ω to zero as I do in my other estimates, I then compute the discounted
expected utility of each of the 21 alternative portfolios of sooner and later earnings:
δtpcαt + δ
t+kpcαt+k
where the probability that payment is received is p = 1 under certainty and p = 0.5 under both
independent and correlated risks. Then, given the allocation actually chosen by the subject in this
task, the multinomial logit probability of the observed choice is given by:
exp (U∗)
exp (U0) + exp (U5) + . . .+ exp (U100)
and the estimates of α and ρ are chosen so as to maximize the probability of the observed choices.
Once again, these estimates were permitted to vary by risk condition, and the model was estimated
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by maximum likelihood in Stata 10.1, with robust standard errors clustered on individual subjects.
The MNL estimates in model (2) of Table 3 display some notable diﬀerences when compared
to the corresponding NLS estimates in model (1). Firstly, the curvature estimates indicate that
choices under certainty and correlated risks are best explained by a convex utility function. This is
consistent with what Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2013) ﬁnd in their reanalysis of the data from
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a), in which payments were not subject to risk. As they observe, it
can be explained theoretically by the need for the model to account for choices at both corners. By
contrast under independent risks, where corner solutions are far less prevalent, the point estimate
of curvature indicates concave utility, although the hypothesis of linear utility cannot be rejected.
More generally, the hypothesis tests in the lower panel of Table 3 indicate that the NLS and MNL
models attribute the diﬀerences in choice behavior between the three risk conditions diﬀerently. As
noted earlier, the NLS estimates point to a single discount function and three distinct curvature
values. By contrast, the MNL estimates point to a distinction between independent risks on one
hand, and certainty and correlated risks on the other. For both the curvature and discounting
parameters the diﬀerence between certainty and correlated risks is not signiﬁcant, and as a result the
joint hypotheses that αCert = αCorr and ρCert = ρCorr cannot be rejected
(
χ2 (2) = 0.60, p = 0.741
)
.
At the same time, and again for both structural parameters, the diﬀerence between independent
risks and either of the two other conditions is always found to be signiﬁcant. In short, the MNL
model draws a sharp distinction between the two conditions in which the possibility of intertemporal
diversiﬁcation does not arise, and the independent risks condition in which it does.
3 An alternative interpretation
In the standard DEU model of equation (1), and in Andreoni and Sprenger's (2012b) interpretation
of their results, diﬀerences in discounting behavior under risk and certainty are attributed to diﬀer-
ences in the concavity of atemporal utility as captured by the parameter α. This form of concavity
suﬃces to generate diversiﬁcation in the familiar static setting in which a decision-maker is exposed
to two risks that arise simultaneously. However as discussed in Online Appendix A, and as ﬁrst
noted by Andersen et al. (2011, Section 5) and Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2013), it does not
generate intertemporal diversiﬁcation across risks that accrue on diﬀerent dates, since the linearity
of intertemporal utility under standard DEU implies that the same behavior is predicted under all
three of my risk conditions.
Since intertemporal diversiﬁcation does indeed appear to be important under independent risks
 as evident from the far greater prevalence of interior solutions compared to both certainty and
correlated risks  it seems more appropriate to attribute this behavior to concavity of intertemporal
utility. A simple speciﬁcation that captures this is to replace equation (1) with:
U =
[
δt (ct − ω)α + δt+k (ct+k − ω)α
]γ
(2)
where the parameter γ captures curvature of intertemporal utility such that (1− γ) is a coeﬃcient
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Table 4: Estimates of a Model Allowing Intertemporal Curvature, from CTB Data
Coef. s.e. 95% C.I.
α 1.315 0.039 1.239 1.391
ρ 1.042 0.286 0.481 1.602
γ 0.768 0.028 0.713 0.824
Log-likelihood =6817.608
Observations 2646
Clusters 63
Notes: Multinomial logit model estimated under the restriction ω = 0, with robust standard errors
clustered at the level of individual subjects.
of relative intertemporal risk aversion or correlation aversion (Andersen et al. 2011, cf. their equa-
tion 12). Andersen et al. (2011) extend the joint estimation methodology to include tasks that
elicit correlation aversion, permitting it to be jointly estimated with discounting and curvature of
atemporal utility. They ﬁnd that their subjects, a sample representative of adult Danes, are indeed
correlation averse, rejecting the speciﬁcation in (1) in favor of (2).
In the context of a CTB-based design, estimation of the parameters of (2) by NLS is complicated
by the fact that there does not appear to exist any closed form solution function under independent
risks. On the other hand, the logic of the MNL estimator extends straightforwardly to this model.
Given candidate values of the atemporal curvature parameter α, annual discount rate ρ, and in-
tertemporal curvature parameter γ, one proceeds as before to evaluate the expected intertemporal
utility of every possible portfolio in the CTB. Then, given the actual allocation that was chosen,
the multinomial logit probability of the observed choice is deﬁned as before. The only additional
complication is to note that in each correlated risks decision there are two possible outcomes (either
the subject receives the entire portfolio or not), whereas in each independent risks decision there
are four. Speciﬁcally, setting the background parameter ω to zero as before, under certainty and
correlated risks the expected intertemporal utility of a given portfolio allocation is:
p
[
δtcαt + δ
t+kcαt+k
]γ
with p = 1 under certainty and p = 0.5 under correlated risks. However under independent risks
the expected intertemporal utility is given by:
p
{
p
[
δtcαt + δ
t+kcαt+k
]γ
+ (1− p) [δtcαt ]γ}+ (1− p){p [δt+kcαt+k]γ}
where the ﬁrst set of braces represents the event that sooner payment is received, and within it the
ﬁrst term represents the event that later payment is also received, and so on.
I report my MNL estimates of this speciﬁcation in Table 4. In presenting these results, I
emphasize that  in contrast to Andersen et al. (2011)  my CTB experiment was not speciﬁcally
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designed for the purpose of estimating γ. Rather, the purpose of these estimates is simply to
illustrate how the intertemporal curvature hypothesis accounts for the patterns observed in my CTB
data. The estimates in Table 4 indicate that it does this by ﬁnding a combination of convex atemporal
utility and concave intertemporal utility, with both estimates diﬀering signiﬁcantly from linearity.
While the ﬁnding of convex atemporal utility is arguably unappealing  and in sharp contrast to
the concave estimate reported by Andersen et al. (2011)  it is again explained by the theoretical
need for atemporal utility to account for the presence of corner solutions at both endpoints under
certainty and correlated risks. On the other hand, the ﬁnding of concave intertemporal utility
motivates the preference for intertemporal diversiﬁcation observed under independent risks.
Finally, while the correlation aversion model predicts the diﬀerence I observe between indepen-
dent and correlated risks, it does not explain any residual diﬀerence between certainty and correlated
risks, since the model predicts the same behavior under both. Insofar as I ﬁnd evidence of a dif-
ference between these two conditions, it thus remains open for interpretation.22 Note however that
the structural MNL estimates in model (2) of Table 3 do not support an interpretation in terms of
separate atemporal utility functions, along the lines suggested by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the robustness of Andreoni and Sprenger's (2012b) ﬁnding of systematic
diﬀerences in intertemporal choice behavior under risk versus certainty to two manipulations of their
CTB design. Firstly, in principle Andreoni and Sprenger's claim that utility is more concave under
risk compared to certainty has the direct implication that joint estimates combining data generated
from these two distinct preferences are potentially biased. In my MPL experiment I ﬁnd very little
support for this proposition, quite simply because I do not replicate Andreoni and Sprenger's main
result when using an MPL instrument.
Next, I examine the role of diversiﬁcation opportunities in driving Andreoni and Sprenger's
ﬁnding of more balanced intertemporal portfolio choices under risk compared to certainty. I ﬁnd
that when the possibility of diversiﬁcation is removed, while the element of risk is maintained, the
eﬀect observed by Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) is reduced in magnitude by just over one-half.
This suggests a role for curvature of the intertemporal utility function, and not only of atemporal
utility, in explaining intertemporal choice under risk  and I report new structural estimates that
support the hypothesis of concave intertemporal utility.
My results also shed new light on the relative merits of the MPL and CTB instruments, informing
the design of future studies of time preference under conditions of risk. By permitting subjects to
choose any point along a budget set instead of forcing them to choose between the endpoints, a CTB
potentially provides richer information than an MPL. This may contribute to why the CTB detects
22One explanation, suggested by an anonymous referee, is that some subjects may have been confused by the cor-
related risks condition and mistakenly believed that they might still beneﬁt from diversiﬁcation. Evidence consistent
with this conjecture may be seen in Figure 3, which shows the number of 50-50 choices under correlated risks to be
fewer than under independent risks, but still greater than under certainty.
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diﬀerences between risk and certainty where an MPL does not. However, when implemented under
risk, a CTB may introduce opportunities for diversiﬁcation where an MPL does not. Moreover once
the possibility of diversiﬁcation is removed through a correlated risks design, the CTB yields a high
incidence of corner solutions leading to the troubling implication of convex utility.
Finally, my ﬁnding of pronounced diﬀerences in behavior under independent versus correlated
risks illustrates how procedural considerations such as the manner in which payments are realized
are not merely arcane details of experimental design, but can exert a powerful inﬂuence on behavior
 potentially to the point of driving a large portion of the observed eﬀects. In this respect, my
results also echo the important recent work of Cox, Sadiraj and Schmidt (2011). Moreover, they
serve as a reminder that design choices that might appear innocuous under standard models such
as DEU may in fact be highly consequential under alternative models such as correlation aversion.
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Appendices: Not for publication
A Model predictions
A.1 Predictions under discounted expected utility
In this Appendix, I demonstrate that the standard model of discounted expected utility (DEU)
predicts identical choices under each of the risk conditions for both of my experiments. I adopt a
general speciﬁcation of the discount function to emphasize that its particular functional form (for
example, exponential or hyperbolic) is not germane to the issue of diﬀerential behavior under risk
versus certainty.23 In keeping with my experimental design, I specialize to cases in which there are
equal probabilities of payment on both the sooner and later payment dates.
A.1.1 Multiple price list
Let u(·) denote the (atemporal) utility function, and let D(·) denote the discount function. Consider
two dates, t and t+ k, where t denotes the front-end delay from the date of the experiment to the
sooner payment date, and k is the additional delay to the later payment date. Finally, let B denote
exogenous background consumption.
Consider the binary choice between Option A, which pays the exogenous amount Ct (as speciﬁed
by the experimenter) with probability p on date t (or zero otherwise), and Option B which pays
Ct+k with probability p on date t+ k. A subject prefers Option A (Option B) as:
D (t) [p u (Ct +B) + (1− p)u (B)]+D (t+ k)u (B) ≷ D (t)u (B)+D (t+ k) [p u (Ct+k +B) + (1− p)u (B)]
or equivalently, as:
D (t) p [u (Ct +B)− u (B)] ≷ D (t+ k) p [u (Ct+k +B)− u (B)]
So long as the probability of payment p is equal on both dates, this inequality does not depend
upon the speciﬁc value of p, and in particular it remains unchanged when p = 1 such that both
payment options are certain. This is a restatement of the proposition that A&S derive in the context
of a CTB design (see Appendix A.1.2 below), as applied to the setting of an MPL.
A.1.2 Convex time budget under independent risks
In the independent risks version of the CTB design, there are two independent lotteries that deter-
mine whether or not payment is received on the sooner and later payment dates. A subject chooses
the budget allocations ct, to be received with probability p on date t (or zero otherwise), and ct+k
to be received with probability p on date t+ k, to maximize:
23A&S also present arguments for alternative speciﬁcations of the utility function that are equally applicable to
the cases considered here.
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D (t) [p u (ct +B) + (1− p)u (B)] +D (t+ k) [p u (ct+k +B) + (1− p)u (B)] (3)
subject to the future value budget constraint:
(1 + r) ct + ct+k = m
where (1 + r) is the gross experimental interest rate.
The tangency condition for an interior solution states that the ratio of discounted, expected,
marginal utilities should equal the relative price ratio:
D (t) p u′ (ct +B)
D (t+ k) p u′ (ct+k +B)
= (1 + r)
So long as the probability of payment p is equal on both dates, this tangency condition does not
depend upon the speciﬁc value of p, and in particular it remains unchanged when p = 1 such that
payments on both dates are certain. This is the proposition that A&S set out to test in their main
(1, 1) versus (0.5, 0.5) manipulation.
A.1.3 Convex time budget under perfectly correlated risks
In the correlated risks version of the CTB design, a single lottery determines whether or not payment
is received on both the sooner and later payment dates. A subject chooses the budget allocations ct
to be received on date t and ct+k to be received on date t+ k, where the entire portfolio is received
with probability p (or zero otherwise), to maximize:
p [D (t)u (ct +B) +D (t+ k)u (ct+k +B)] + (1− p) [D (t)u (B) +D (t+ k)u (B)] (4)
Clearly, this expression is algebraically equivalent to (3), resulting in an equivalent tangency
condition (and solution function) which again does not depend upon the value of p, and in particular
remains unchanged when p = 1 such that all payments are certain.
A.2 Extension to a non-additive speciﬁcation
The standard DEU model thus predicts identical choices across all three risk conditions in my CTB
experiment (certainty, independent risks, and correlated risks). Intuitively, in that model both
discounting and expected utility are linear operators, and so it does not matter whether a subject
maximizes discounted expected utility as in (3) or expected discounted utility as in (4). In particular,
the model does not predict intertemporal diversiﬁcation in the independent risks condition compared
to the correlated risks condition in which diversiﬁcation is not possible.
To generate such a prediction, it is necessary to break the nexus between (3) and (4) by intro-
ducing a non-additive speciﬁcation. One simple way to do this has been explored by Andersen et al.
(2011), who estimate such a model under speciﬁc functional form assumptions. For ease of notation,
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deﬁne ξ (ct, ct+k) ≡ D (t)u (ct)+D (t+ k)u (ct+k) and disregard background consumption from here
on. Then the approach adopted by Andersen et al. embeds ξ within a concave intertemporal utility
function U (·), over which expectations are formed in the usual manner.24
In this speciﬁcation, in a CTB with correlated risks, a subject chooses ct and ct+k to maximize:
pU (ξ (ct, ct+k)) + (1− p)U (ξ (0, 0))
The tangency condition for an interior solution is now:
pU ′ (ξ (ct, ct+k))D (t)u′ (ct)
pU ′ (ξ (ct, ct+k))D (t+ k)u′ (ct+k)
= (1 + r) (5)
Once again, this does not depend upon the value of p, and in particular it remains unchanged
when p = 1 such that all payments are certain. This simple non-additive speciﬁcation thus continues
to predict identical choices under certainty as compared to correlated risks.
However, under independent risks ct and ct+k would be chosen to maximize:
p [pU (ξ (ct, ct+k)) + (1− p)U (ξ (ct, 0))] + (1− p) [pU (ξ (0, ct+k)) + (1− p)U (ξ (0, 0))]
In this case, the tangency condition becomes:
p [pU ′ (ξ (ct, ct+k)) + (1− p)U ′ (ξ (ct, 0))]D (t)u′ (ct)
p [pU ′ (ξ (ct, ct+k)) + (1− p)U ′ (ξ (0, ct+k))]D (t+ k)u′ (ct+k) = (1 + r) (6)
Comparing this expression to (5), the expected marginal intertemporal utility of a payment
received on date t now incorporates an additional term corresponding to the case in which payment
is received on date t but not on date t + k, and vice-versa for the marginal utility of a payment
received on date t+k. It is the consideration of these additional cases, not present in the correlated
risks condition, that gives rise to the motive for intertemporal diversiﬁcation under independent
risks. As a result, the tangency condition in (6) is no longer invariant to the value of p.25
24Andersen et al. adopt CRRA speciﬁcations for both the atemporal utility function u (·) and the intertemporal
utility function U (·) .
25The standard model is nested as the special case in which the intertemporal utility function U (·) is linear, such
that U ′ (·) is constant, in which case (6) collapses to (5) and so all three risk conditions are equivalent as before.
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B Details of experimental parameters
B.1 Parameters of the multiple price list experiment
Table B1 summarizes the parameters of the risk preference tasks in the MPL experiment. In each
decision row, a subject was required to make a binary choice between Option A or Option B. Payoﬀs
are expressed in AUD. At the time of the MPL experiment, one AUD was worth approximately
USD 1.10. The expected value information in the ﬁnal two columns was not presented to subjects.
Table B1: Risk Preference Decisions in the MPL Experiment.
Decision Probability of Option A Option A Option B Option B EV of EV of
Row High Payoﬀ High Payoﬀ Low Payoﬀ High Payoﬀ Low Payoﬀ Option A Option B
1 0.1 16 13 31 1 13.3 4.0
2 0.2 16 13 31 1 13.6 7.0
3 0.3 16 13 31 1 13.9 10.0
4 0.4 16 13 31 1 14.2 13.0
5 0.5 16 13 31 1 14.5 16.0
6 0.6 16 13 31 1 14.8 19.0
7 0.7 16 13 31 1 15.1 22.0
8 0.8 16 13 31 1 15.4 25.0
9 0.9 16 13 31 1 15.7 28.0
10 1.0 16 13 31 1 16.0 31.0
11 0.1 19 12 27 2 12.7 4.5
12 0.2 19 12 27 2 13.4 7.0
13 0.3 19 12 27 2 14.1 9.5
14 0.4 19 12 27 2 14.8 12.0
15 0.5 19 12 27 2 15.5 14.5
16 0.6 19 12 27 2 16.2 17.0
17 0.7 19 12 27 2 16.9 19.5
18 0.8 19 12 27 2 17.6 22.0
19 0.9 19 12 27 2 18.3 24.5
20 1.0 19 12 27 2 19.0 27.0
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Table B1: Risk Preference Decisions in the MPL Experiment (continued).
Decision Probability of Option A Option A Option B Option B EV of EV of
Row High Payoﬀ High Payoﬀ Low Payoﬀ High Payoﬀ Low Payoﬀ Option A Option B
21 0.1 17 11 30 4 11.6 6.6
22 0.2 17 11 30 4 12.2 9.2
23 0.3 17 11 30 4 12.8 11.8
24 0.4 17 11 30 4 13.4 14.4
25 0.5 17 11 30 4 14.0 17.0
26 0.6 17 11 30 4 14.6 19.6
27 0.7 17 11 30 4 15.2 22.2
28 0.8 17 11 30 4 15.8 24.8
29 0.9 17 11 30 4 16.4 27.4
30 1.0 17 11 30 4 17.0 30.0
31 0.1 28 2 18 14 4.6 14.4
32 0.2 28 2 18 14 7.2 14.8
33 0.3 28 2 18 14 9.8 15.2
34 0.4 28 2 18 14 12.4 15.6
35 0.5 28 2 18 14 15.0 16.0
36 0.6 28 2 18 14 17.6 16.4
37 0.7 28 2 18 14 20.2 16.8
38 0.8 28 2 18 14 22.8 17.2
39 0.9 28 2 18 14 25.4 17.6
40 1.0 28 2 18 14 28.0 18.0
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Table B2 summarizes the parameters of the time preference tasks in the MPL experiment. In each
decision row, a subject was required to make a binary choice between Option A or Option B. Delay
lengths are expressed here in days, although they were presented to subjects in terms of weeks, and
payments are expressed in AUD. The gross interest rate information in the ﬁnal column was not
presented to subjects.
Each decision was faced under two diﬀerent risk conditions: one in which all payments were
certain, and one in which payments were received with 50% probability. Half of the subjects
completed the discounting tasks under certainty before the discounting tasks under risk, while for
the other half this order was reversed.
Table B2: Time Preference Decisions in the MPL Experiment.
Decision Front-end Delay (t) Further Delay (k) Sooner Payment Later Payment Gross Interest
Row to Sooner Option to Later Option (Option A) (Option B) Rate (1 + r)
1 7 21 20 21 1.05
2 7 21 20 22 1.10
3 7 21 20 23 1.15
4 7 21 20 24 1.20
5 7 21 20 25 1.25
6 7 21 20 26 1.30
7 7 21 20 27 1.35
8 7 21 20 28 1.40
9 7 21 20 29 1.45
10 7 21 20 30 1.50
11 7 42 20 30 1.50
12 7 42 21 30 1.43
13 7 42 22 30 1.36
14 7 42 23 30 1.30
15 7 42 24 30 1.25
16 7 42 25 30 1.20
17 7 42 26 30 1.15
18 7 42 27 30 1.11
19 7 42 28 30 1.07
20 7 42 29 30 1.03
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Table B2: Time Preference Decisions in the MPL Experiment (continued).
Decision Front-end Delay (t) Further Delay (k) Sooner Payment Later Payment Gross Interest
Row to Sooner Option to Later Option (Option A) (Option B) Rate (1 + r)
21 7 63 20 21 1.05
22 7 63 20 22 1.10
23 7 63 20 23 1.15
24 7 63 20 24 1.20
25 7 63 20 25 1.25
26 7 63 20 26 1.30
27 7 63 20 27 1.35
28 7 63 20 28 1.40
29 7 63 20 29 1.45
30 7 63 20 30 1.50
31 7 84 20 30 1.50
32 7 84 21 30 1.43
33 7 84 22 30 1.36
34 7 84 23 30 1.30
35 7 84 24 30 1.25
36 7 84 25 30 1.20
37 7 84 26 30 1.15
38 7 84 27 30 1.11
39 7 84 28 30 1.07
40 7 84 29 30 1.03
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B.2 Parameters of the convex time budget experiment
Table B3 summarizes the parameters of the CTB experiment. In each decision row, a subject was
required to allocate an endowment of 100 tokens between Payment A (received on date t) and
Payment B (received on date t+ k). Delay lengths are expressed here in days, although they were
presented to subjects in terms of weeks, and token exchange rates are expressed in AUD. Consistent
with A&S, the gross interest rate information in the ﬁnal column was not presented to subjects.
These parameters are identical to those in A&S Table 1, except that the delay lengths were changed
from 28 and 56 days in A&S to 35 and 70 days to avoid a public holiday, and that payments were
denominated in AUD instead of USD. At the time of the CTB experiment, one AUD was worth
approximately USD 1.05.
Each decision was faced under three diﬀerent risk conditions: one in which all payments were
certain, one in which the sooner and later payments were received with 50% probability as realized
by two independent lotteries, and one in which the sooner and later payments were received with 50%
probability as realized by a single lottery. Half of the subjects completed these three risk conditions
in the order Independent-Certain-Correlated, while for the other half this order was reversed.
Table B3: Decision Parameters for the CTB Experiment.
Decision Front-end Further Token Sooner Later Gross Interest
Row Delay (t) Delay (k) Endowment Token Value Token Value Rate (1 + r)
1 7 35 100 0.20 0.20 1.00
2 7 35 100 0.19 0.20 1.05
3 7 35 100 0.18 0.20 1.11
4 7 35 100 0.17 0.20 1.18
5 7 35 100 0.16 0.20 1.25
6 7 35 100 0.15 0.20 1.33
7 7 35 100 0.14 0.20 1.43
8 7 70 100 0.20 0.20 1.00
9 7 70 100 0.19 0.20 1.05
10 7 70 100 0.18 0.20 1.11
11 7 70 100 0.17 0.20 1.18
12 7 70 100 0.16 0.20 1.25
13 7 70 100 0.15 0.20 1.33
14 7 70 100 0.14 0.20 1.43
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C Instructions for the multiple price list experiment
ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE
Welcome to today's session, and thank you for coming here on time. Please do not talk to the other
participants while the session is in progress. Mobile phones must also be turned oﬀ. If you have a
question, please raise your hand, and one of us will come to you to answer it in private.
In this study, there is a chance you may receive part of your payment in the future.
Therefore, to be eligible to participate, you must be willing to receive this part of your payment
by cheque, to be written to you by Dr Stephen Cheung, a Lecturer in the School of Economics.
This cheque would be drawn on the University of Sydney branch of the National Australia Bank.
The cheque would be delivered by Express Post to your nominated residential mailing address
in Sydney, at a date that depends on both your decisions in the study, and on chance. The latest
you could receive this payment is thirteen weeks from today, in the last week of classes in Semester
two.
Therefore, to take part in this study, you must be willing to provide your name and residential
mailing address in Sydney. This information will only be seen by Dr Cheung and his assistants.
After payment has been sent, this information will no longer be retained. Your identity will not
be a part of any subsequent data analysis.
Finally, you must be willing to stay for the full duration of today's session; otherwise you will
not receive any payment at all.
If you do not agree to all of these points, please raise your hand now.
If you agree, please turn over this page to sign the consent form, and hand it in now.
GENERAL INFORMATION AND EARNINGS
This study is ﬁnanced by the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and concerns the economics of
decision making. The instructions are simple, and you will beneﬁt from considering them carefully.
In this study you will make a total of 120 choices involving amounts of money that diﬀer with
respect to the time when money is received, and/or the chances of receiving the money. These
decisions will be divided into two sets. There are 40 choices in Decision Set I, and 80 choices in
Decision Set II.
These decisions are not designed to test you  the only correct answers are the ones that you
really think are best for you.
Afterwards, we will ask you to complete a questionnaire about yourself. This information is for
our records only. Our records and the results of our research will not identify any individual or the
choices he or she made in any way. All records will be linked to an anonymous ID number only.
At the end, we will call you into the oﬃce, one at a time, to calculate your earnings.
29
You will be paid $5 for participating, and you can also earn a considerable amount in addition
to this. How much you earn will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices that you make.
Your earnings from the study are made up of three parts.
 Firstly, we will pay a participation fee of $5 if you submit valid responses for all 120 decisions
as well as the questionnaire. This will be paid to you in cash at the end of the session.
 Secondly, you will be paid according to your choice in one randomly-selected decision from
Decision Set I. The amount you receive will depend on both the choice that you made, as well
as on chance. This amount will also be paid to you in cash at the end of the session.
 Thirdly, you will be paid according to your choice in one randomly-selected decision from
Decision Set II. The date of this payment depends on the choice that you made, while the
amount depends on both your choice as well as on chance.
In some choices in Decision Set II there is a possibility  to be decided by chance  that you may
not receive any payment at all. If the decision that is chosen to count involves chance, we will roll
a ten-sided die at the end of the session to determine whether or not any payment is made.
This means that you will be told whether or not you will receive any payment in Decision Set
II  and if so, how much and when  before you leave today.
If it is determined that you will receive a payment in Decision Set II, it will be sent to you by
cheque, delivered by Express Post to your nominated residential mailing address in Sydney, on a
date determined by your own choice.
DECISION SET I
In Decision Set I, you will make choices between two options labelled A and B. We will present
you with 40 of these decisions.
All decisions have the same format. The only diﬀerence is that the amounts of money in Options
A and B, and the chances that each amount will be paid, will diﬀer from one decision to the next.
The 40 choices are further divided into four sets of ten. Within each set of ten decisions the
amounts of money remain the same, and it is only the chances that each amount will be paid that
change.
You will be paid according to your choice in one of the 40 decisions in Decision Set I. At the
time you make your choices you will not know which decision will be selected for payment. Since all
decisions are equally likely to be chosen, you should treat each decision as if it may be the decision
that counts.
At the end of the session, we will roll a four-sided die and a ten-sided die to randomly determine
which one of the 40 decisions will be the one that counts. The payment that you receive will be
determined by the choice that you made  either Option A or Option B  in the selected decision.
We will then roll the ten-sided die a second time to determine what payment you will receive,
based upon your choice of Option A or B. This amount will be added to your $5 participation fee,
and paid to you in cash at the end of the session.
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Now please look at the ﬁrst Decision Table on the next page.
This Decision Table shows ten decisions. Each decision is a paired choice between Option A
and Option B. You will be asked to make a choice between these two options in each decision
row.
Before you start making your choices, let us explain how these choices aﬀect your earnings. We
will use a ten-sided die to determine payoﬀs; the faces are numbered from 1 to 10 (the 0 face of
the die will serve as 10). Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top of the table.
Option A pays $16 if the roll of the ten-sided die is 1, and $13 if the roll is 210. Option B pays
$31 if the roll of the die is 1, and $1 if the roll is 210.
The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of the
higher payoﬀ in each option increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will not
be needed since each option pays the higher payoﬀ for sure, so your choice here is between $16 and
$31.
For each of these ten decisions, you are asked to choose Option A or Option B by marking an
X in the appropriate box in each row. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other
rows, and you may make your decisions in any order.
The other Decision Tables are similar, except that the amounts of money oﬀered in Options A
and B will diﬀer in each table.
One of the 40 decisions in Decision Set I will be randomly selected in the end to count toward
your earnings. You will not know in advance which decision will be used. Each decision has an
equal chance of being used in the end.
Your earnings from Decision Set I will be determined at the end of the session, when you are
called into the oﬃce to be paid.
 Firstly, we will roll a four-sided die to decide which of the four Decision Tables will count.
 Next, we will roll a ten-sided die to decide which of the ten rows in the chosen table will count.
(If this roll of the die is 0 then the tenth row will be chosen.)
 Finally, we will roll the ten-sided die a second time to determine your earnings for the option
that you chose, either Option A or Option B, in the decision selected by the ﬁrst two die rolls.
For example, if the roll of the four-sided die is 2, then Decision Table 2 is chosen. If the ﬁrst roll of
the ten-sided die is 8, then Decision 18 is chosen to count. Finally, if the second roll of the ten-sided
die is 4, then your earnings would be $19 if you chose Option A, or $27 if you chose Option B.
Please make your choices by marking an X in the appropriate box in each row of each Decision
Table. If you have a question, please raise your hand, and one of us will come to assist you in
private.
DECISION SET II
In Decision Set II, you will make choices between two options labelled A and B. These choices
involve receiving money at two diﬀerent points in time. In each case Option A is sooner and
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Option B is later. We will present you with 80 of these decisions.
All decisions have the same format. They diﬀer in the amounts of money and payment dates,
as well as the chances that the payments will be made. You could receive payment as early as one
week from today, or as late as the last week of classes in Semester two, or another date in between.
It is important to note that some of these payments involve chance. In some decisions, there is
a possibility that you may not receive any payment at all. You will be fully informed of the chances
associated with the two options at the time that you make each decision.
The 80 choices are further divided into eight sets of ten. Within each set of ten decisions, the
payment dates and chances that payments are made remain the same. It is only the amounts of
money in Options A and B that change.
You will be paid according to your choice in one of the 80 decisions in Decision Set II. At the
time you make your choices you will not know which decision will be selected for payment. Since all
decisions are equally likely to be chosen, you should treat each decision as if it may be the decision
that counts.
At the end of the session we will roll an eight-sided die and a ten-sided die to randomly determine
which one of the 80 decisions will be the one that counts. The amount and date of your payment
will be determined by the choice that you made  either Option A or Option B  in the selected
decision.
If the decision that is chosen to count involves chance, we will roll the ten-sided die again to
determine whether any payment is made. This means that you will be told whether or not you will
receive any payment in Decision Set II  and if so, how much and when  before you leave today.
If it is determined that you will receive a payment, it will be sent to you by cheque, by Express
Post to your nominated residential mailing address in Sydney, on the date speciﬁed by your choice.
One business day before the scheduled payment date, the cheque will dispatched for delivery by
Express Post by Dr Cheung and his assistants. Australia Post guarantees next business day delivery
for mail sent by Express Post to addresses within the Sydney metropolitan region.
Attached to your Participation Information Statement is Dr Cheung's business card. Please
keep this in a safe place. If it is determined that you will receive a payment by cheque, but you do
not receive your cheque on the nominated date, you should contact Dr Cheung.
To process payment by cheque, we will need to collect your name and residential mailing address
in Sydney. This will only be seen by Dr Cheung and his assistants. After payment has been sent,
this information will no longer be retained. Your identity will not be a part of subsequent data
analysis.
Now please turn to the ﬁrst Decision Table on the next page.
This Decision Table shows ten decisions. Each decision is a paired choice between Option A
and Option B. You will be asked to make a choice between these two options in each decision
row.
Option A pays $20 one week from today if the roll of a ten-sided die is 15, or nothing otherwise.
Option B pays $21 four weeks from today if the roll of the die is 15, or nothing otherwise.
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The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the amount of money
oﬀered in Option B increases.
For each of these ten decisions, you are asked to choose Option A or Option B by marking an
X in the appropriate box in each row. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other
rows, and you may make your decisions in any order.
The other seven Decision Tables are similar except that the payment dates, amounts of money,
and chances that payments will be made, will diﬀer in each table.
Although you will make 80 decisions in Decision Set I, only one of these will be randomly selected
in the end to count toward your earnings. You will not know in advance which decision will be
used. Each decision has an equal chance of being used in the end.
Your earnings from Decision Set II will be determined at the end of the session, when you are
called into the oﬃce to be paid.
 Firstly, we will roll an eight-sided die to decide which of the eight Decision Tables will count.
 Next, we will roll a ten-sided die to decide which of the ten rows in the chosen table will count.
(If this roll of the die is 0 then the tenth row will be chosen.)
 Finally, if the decision that is chosen to count involves chance, we will roll the ten-sided die a
second time to determine whether or not any payment is made. If a payment is to be made,
the amount and date are determined by the choice that you made in the selected decision.
For example, if the roll of the eight-sided die is 2, then Decision Table 2 is chosen. If the ﬁrst roll
of the ten-sided die is 8, then Decision 18 is chosen to count.
Finally, if the second roll of the ten-sided die is 4, then you would receive $27 one week from
today you chose Option A, or $30 seven weeks from today if you chose Option B. However, if the
second roll of the ten-sided die were 6, then you would not receive any payment.
Please make your choices by marking an X in the appropriate box in each row of each Decision
Table. If you have a question, please raise your hand, and one of us will come to assist you in
private.
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D Instructions for the convex time budget experiment
ELIGIBILITY TO PARTICIPATE
Welcome to today's session, and thank you for coming here on time. Please do not talk to the other
participants while the session is in progress. Mobile phones must also be turned oﬀ. If you have a
question, please raise your hand, and someone will come to you to answer it in private.
In this study, you will receive all of your payments in the future.
Therefore, to be eligible to participate, you must be willing to receive your payments by cheque,
to be written to you by Dr Stephen Cheung, a Lecturer in the School of Economics. These cheques
will be drawn on the University of Sydney branch of the National Australia Bank.
The cheques will be delivered by Express Post to your nominated residential mailing address in
Sydney, on two dates that depend on both your decisions in the study, and on chance. The ﬁrst
payment will come one week from today. The latest that you could receive the second payment is
eleven weeks from today, in the last week of classes this semester.
Therefore, to take part in this study, you must be willing to provide your name and residential
mailing address in Sydney. This information will only be seen by Dr Cheung and his assistants.
After payment has been sent, this information will no longer be retained. Your identity will not
be a part of any subsequent data analysis.
Finally, you must be willing to stay for the full duration of today's session; otherwise you will
not receive any payment at all.
If you do not agree to all of these points, please raise your hand now.
If you agree, please turn over this page to sign the consent form, and hand it in now.
EARNINGS
For completing today's study, you will receive a minimum of $10. You will receive this in two
payments of $5, which will arrive on two diﬀerent dates. The ﬁrst payment will come one week from
today. The second will be on a date to be determined by chance, as explained below.
You may also receive additional earnings from the study. These depend on both your own
decisions, as well as on chance. They would be added to one or both of your two minimum payments
of $5.
Today you will make 42 choices, but only one of them will be randomly selected at the end to
count toward your earnings.
In each choice, you must decide how to allocate money between two points in time; one date is
sooner and the other is later. This means you could receive payments as early as one week from
today, as late as the last week of classes this semester, or another date in between.
It is important to note that some of these decisions involve chance. There is a chance that your
sooner payment, your later payment or both payments may not be sent at all.
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 In one-third of the decisions, whether or not you receive the sooner payment is determined by
rolling a purple ten-sided die, while the later payment is determined by a white ten-sided die.
Therefore in these decisions, the two payments are determined by two separate die rolls.
 In one-third of the decisions, both payments are determined by a single die roll. In these
decisions, both the sooner and later payments are determined by rolling the white ten-sided
die.
 Finally, in one-third of the decisions, the payments do not depend on any die roll at all.
The nature of these chances will always be clearly indicated at the top of each decision sheet.
Once all 42 decisions have been made, we will draw a numbered ball from the bingo cage. This
will determine which decision will be the one that counts, and the corresponding payment dates.
We will use this decision to determine your earnings. Since every decision is equally likely to be
chosen, you should treat each decision as if it may be the one that counts.
If the decision that is chosen to count involves chance, we will then determine whether or not
you receive the payments by rolling the ten-sided die. This means that you will be told whether or
not you will receive these payments before you leave today.
Your earnings from the decision that counts will be added to the two minimum payments of $5
each. If, by chance, one or both of your payments is not sent, you will receive only the $5 payment
on that date. Thus, you will always receive at least $5 on the sooner date and at least $5 on the
later date.
One business day before each scheduled payment date, a cheque will dispatched for delivery by
Express Post by Dr Cheung and his assistants. Australia Post guarantees next business day delivery
for mail sent by Express Post to addresses within the Sydney metropolitan region.
Attached to your Participation Information Statement is Dr Cheung's business card. Please
keep this in a safe place. If you do not receive one of your cheques on the designated date, please
contact Dr Cheung.
INSTRUCTIONS
In each decision you are asked to divide 100 tokens between two payments at two diﬀerent dates:
Payment A (which is sooner) and Payment B (which is later).
Tokens will be exchanged for money. The tokens you allocate to Payment B (later) will always
be worth at least as much as the tokens you allocate to Payment A (sooner).
The sample decision below is similar to the ones you will make today. It shows the choice to
allocate 100 tokens between Payment A on 27 March and Payment B on 10 April. In the example,
each token allocated to 27 March is worth $0.10, while each token allocated to 10 April is worth
$0.15. You may allocate some tokens to the sooner date and some to the later date.
Example: If you were to allocate 62 tokens to 27 March and 38 tokens to 10 April, then you
would have the chance to receive 62 × $0.10 = $6.20 on 27 March (+ $5 minimum payment) and
the chance to receive 38 × $0.15 = $5.70 on 10 April (+ $5 minimum payment).
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Today's date will always be highlighted in red on the calendar. The sooner date will be marked
in green, and the later date in blue. The dates will also be indicated in the table on the right.
In the actual study, there are seven decisions on each table, and you will complete six tables in
total.
Chance of receiving payments:
Each decision sheet also shows the chances that each payment is sent. In the example, Payment A
would be sent if the roll of the purple ten-sided die is between 1 and 7, while Payment B would be
sent if the roll of the white ten-sided die is between 1 and 3.
In each decision we will inform you of the exact nature of the die rolls that determine whether
your payments are sent. If this decision was chosen as the one that counts, we would determine the
actual payments by rolling the ten-sided die.
Example: Suppose that you allocated 62 tokens to 27 March and 38 tokens to 10 April. If this
decision was chosen as the one that counts, we would roll both the purple and white ten-sided die.
 If the purple die landed on 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7, Payment A would be sent and you would
receive $6.20 (+ $5 minimum payment) on 27 March. If the purple die on landed on 8, 9, or
0, Payment A would not be sent and you would receive only the $5 minimum payment on 27
March.
 If the white die landed on 1, 2, or 3, Payment B would be sent and you would receive $5.70 (+
$5 minimum payment) on 10 April. If the white die landed on 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 0, Payment
B would not be sent and you would receive only the $5 minimum payment on 10 April.
SUMMARY
 You will receive a minimum of $10, in two payments of $5 which will arrive on two diﬀerent
dates. Any additional payments will be added to one or both of the two minimum payments.
 You will make a total of 42 decisions, and one of them will be randomly selected at the end
to determine your earnings.
 You will always allocate exactly 100 tokens. Tokens that you allocate to Payment A (sooner)
and Payment B (later) will be exchanged for money at diﬀerent rates. The tokens you allocate
to Payment B will always be worth at least as much as the ones you allocate to Payment A.
 Payment A and Payment B will have varying degrees of chance. In some choices they depend
on two separate die rolls, in some they depend on a single die roll, and in some they do not
depend on any die roll. You will be fully informed of the exact nature of these chances.
 On each decision sheet you will make seven decisions. For each decision you will allocate 100
tokens. Allocate exactly 100 tokens in each decision: no more, no less.
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 At the end of the session, a random number will be drawn from the bingo cage to determine
which decision will be the one that counts. Because each decision is equally likely to be chosen,
you should treat each decision as if it may be the one that determines your payments.
 If necessary, we will then roll one or two ten-sided die to determine whether or not the
payments you chose will actually be sent.
 Your payments, by cheque, will be sent to the address you provide.
 Each cheque will be dispatched by Express Post one business day before payment is due.
Australia Post guarantees next business day delivery.
 You have been given the business card of Dr Stephen Cheung. Keep this card in a safe place
and contact Dr Cheung immediately if one of your payments is not received.
Reminder: Please make sure that the total tokens you allocate between Payment A
and Payment B sum to exactly 100 tokens in each row.
On your desk are two envelopes: one for the sooner payment and one for the later
payment. Please take the time now to address these to yourself at your own residential
mailing address in Sydney.
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E Sample decision sheet from the CTB experiment
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ee
k 
fr
om
 to
da
y)
 
Ch
an
ce
 o
f p
ay
m
en
t: 
50
%
 
Pa
ym
en
t s
en
t i
f: 
ro
ll 
of
 P
U
RP
LE
 d
ie
 is
 1
-5
 
 
Pa
ym
en
t B
: 1
 M
ay
 
(6
 w
ee
ks
 fr
om
 to
da
y)
 
Ch
an
ce
 o
f p
ay
m
en
t: 
50
%
 
Pa
ym
en
t s
en
t i
f: 
ro
ll 
of
 W
HI
TE
 d
ie
 is
 1
-5
 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
2 
 
19
 
20
 
21
 
22
 
23
 
24
 
25
 
 
26
 
27
 
28
 
29
 
30
 
31
 
 
 
Ap
ril
 2
01
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
De
ci
sio
n 
1 
__
__
_ 
to
ke
ns
 a
t  
$0
.2
0 
ea
ch
  o
n 
27
 M
ar
ch
 
an
d 
__
__
_ 
to
ke
ns
 a
t  
$0
.2
0 
ea
ch
  o
n 
1 
M
ay
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
 
9 
10
 
11
 
12
 
13
 
14
 
15
 
 
De
ci
sio
n 
2 
__
__
_ 
to
ke
ns
 a
t  
$0
.1
9 
ea
ch
  o
n 
27
 M
ar
ch
 
an
d 
__
__
_ 
to
ke
ns
 a
t  
$0
.2
0 
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ch
  o
n 
1 
M
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28
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De
ci
sio
n 
3 
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__
_ 
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ke
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t  
$0
.1
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ch
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d 
__
__
_ 
to
ke
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 a
t  
$0
.2
0 
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  o
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M
ay
 
30
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
ay
 2
01
2 
 
De
ci
sio
n 
4 
__
__
_ 
to
ke
ns
 a
t  
$0
.1
7 
ea
ch
  o
n 
27
 M
ar
ch
 
an
d 
__
__
_ 
to
ke
ns
 a
t  
$0
.2
0 
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ch
  o
n 
1 
M
ay
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 
7 
8 
9 
10
 
11
 
12
 
13
 
 
De
ci
sio
n 
5 
__
__
_ 
to
ke
ns
 a
t  
$0
.1
6 
ea
ch
  o
n 
27
 M
ar
ch
 
an
d 
__
__
_ 
to
ke
ns
 a
t  
$0
.2
0 
ea
ch
  o
n 
1 
M
ay
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15
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17
 
18
 
19
 
20
 
 
21
 
22
 
23
 
24
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26
 
27
 
 
De
ci
sio
n 
6 
__
__
_ 
to
ke
ns
 a
t  
$0
.1
5 
ea
ch
  o
n 
27
 M
ar
ch
 
an
d 
__
__
_ 
to
ke
ns
 a
t  
$0
.2
0 
ea
ch
  o
n 
1 
M
ay
 
28
 
29
 
30
 
31
 
 
 
 
 
Ju
ne
 2
01
2 
 
De
ci
sio
n 
7 
__
__
_ 
to
ke
ns
 a
t  
$0
.1
4 
ea
ch
  o
n 
27
 M
ar
ch
 
an
d 
__
__
_ 
to
ke
ns
 a
t  
$0
.2
0 
ea
ch
  o
n 
1 
M
ay
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
PL
EA
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 M
AK
E 
SU
RE
 A
 +
 B
 T
O
KE
N
S 
= 
10
0 
IN
 E
AC
H 
RO
W
. 
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